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The friendship paradox states that, on average, our friends have more friends than we do. In network
terms, the average degree over the nodes can never exceed the average degree over the neighbours of
nodes. This effect, which is a classic example of sampling bias, has attracted much attention in the social
science and network science literature, with variations and extensions of the paradox being defined, tested
and interpreted. Here, we show that a version of the paradox holds rigorously for eigenvector centrality:
on average, our friends are more important than us. We then consider general matrix-function centrality,
including Katz centrality, and give sufficient conditions for the paradox to hold. We also discuss which
results can be generalized to the cases of directed and weighted edges. In this way, we add theoretical
support for a field that has largely been evolving through empirical testing.
Keywords: combinatorics; degree; eigenvector centrality; friendship paradox; graph theory; Katz centrality;
matrix function; Perron-Frobenius theory; sampling bias; walk
1. Motivation
Consider the graph in Fig. 1. Imagine that the nodes represent people and the edges represent reciprocated
friendships. Nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 have 4, 1, 1, 1, 3, 2, 3, 1 friends, respectively. So the average number
of friends possessed by a node is 16/8 = 2. Now look at the friends of each node. The four friends of
node 1 possess {1, 1, 1, 3} friends. Similarly for nodes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 we find {4}, {4}, {4}, {4, 2, 3}, {3, 3},
{2, , 3, 1} and {3}, respectively. So the average number of friends possessed by a friend is 42/16 = 2.625,
which is greater than 2. This effect—that our friends have more friends than we do, on average—was
identified by Feld [1] and has become known as the friendship paradox. Feld showed that the friend-
of-friend average always dominates the friend average, with equality if and only if all individuals have
the same number of friends. The paradox is a classic example of sampling bias. In Fig. 1, node 1 has 4
friends and hence appears 4 times in the friend-of-friend sum, whereas node 2 only contributes its value
1 on a single occasion; in general, highly connected nodes have a greater influence on the sum.
The friendship paradox has motivated much activity in the social network literature and is also
mentioned regularly in the wider media; see, for example, [2]. Researchers have measured the extent to
which the discrepancy holds on real networks involving, for example, high school and university students
[1, 3, 4], scientific coauthors [5], plants and pollinators [6] and users of social media [7–9]. (We mention
that some of these studies also looked at individual-level analogues, such as ‘what proportion of nodes
have fewer friends than the average over their friends’? In this work, we focus exclusively on the global
averages used in the original reference [1].)
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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2 D. J. HIGHAM
Fig. 1. Simple undirected network with eight nodes.
Extending this idea, Eom and Jo [5] looked at the case where each node may be quantified according
to some externally derived attribute and studied the generalized friendship paradox: on average, do our
friends have more of this attribute than us? They showed that the answer is yes for attributes that correlate
positively with the number of friends and found the effect to hold empirically for certain scientific
collaboration networks in the case where the attribute was publication or citation count. Similarly, Hodas
et al. [8] made empirical studies of Twitter networks and tested for a friend activity paradox (are our
friends more active than us?) and for a virality paradox (do our friends spread more viral content than
us?).
Our aim here is to study the generalized friendship paradox in the case where the attribute is impor-
tance, as quantified by a network centrality measure. Aside from the fact that centrality is a fundamental
and informative nodal property [10–12], we also note that centrality measures are defined explicitly in
terms of the network topology, and hence there is potential to derive results that hold universally, or at
least for some well-defined classes of network. This allows us to add further theoretical backing that
complements the recent data-driven studies mentioned above. Our results also alleviate the need for cer-
tain experiments. For example, in [3] Grund tested the eigenvector centrality version of the generalized
friendship paradox on two small-scale friendship networks; Theorem 3.1 in Section 3 shows that this
paradox holds for all networks.
This manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up some notation, formalize the friend-
ship paradox and explain how it follows directly from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. We also define
the generalized friendship paradox from [5] and show how it arises when the quantity of interest cor-
relates with degree. The new material starts in Section 3, where we show that a paradox always holds
for eigenvector centrality. In Section 4, we consider other types of network centrality based on matrix
functions. Using a combinatorial result from [13] we show that the paradox holds for certain types of
matrix function. We also derive and interpret sufficient conditions for general matrix functions defined
through power series with non-negative coefficients, including the resolvent case corresponding to Katz
centrality. Sections 3 and 4 deal with undirected, unweighted networks. In Section 5, we look at directed
networks, where the picture is less straightforward. We discuss various paradoxes that arise from the
use of out-degree and in-degree, and give some sufficient conditions for centrality-based analogues. We
explain in Section 6 how all results extend readily to the case of non-negatively weighted networks. We
conclude in Section 7 with an overview of the main results and an indication of possible future lines of
pursuit.
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CENTRALITY-FRIENDSHIP PARADOXES 3
2. Friendship paradox and generalized friendship paradox
SupposeA represents the adjacencymatrix for an undirected, unweighted, networkwith n nodes. (Directed
edges will be considered in Section 5 and weighted edges in Section 6.) So A ∈ Rn×n, with aii = 0 and
with aij = aji = 1 if nodes i and j are connected. To avoid the trivial special case of an empty network,
we assume at least one edge exists. Letting 1 ∈ Rn denote the vector with all components equal to one,
we may define the degree vector
d = A1,
where di gives the degree of node i.
We will make use of the two-norm and the one-norm, which for a vector x ∈ Rn are defined by
‖x‖2 =
√
x⊤x and ‖x‖1 =
n∑
i=1
|xi|,
respectively.We note that in many cases wewill be dealing with a non-negatively valued vector x, whence
the one-norm reduces to the sum of the entries.
In this notation, the average degree over the nodes may be written
‖d‖1
n
.
In the friendship paradox, we wish to compare this quantity with the average of the values that arise
when we take each node, look at each of that node’s neighbours, and record how many neighbours those
neighbours have. When we do this count, each node i appears as a neighbour di times and each time it
contributes di neighbours, so the count totals d⊤d. The number of terms in the count is twice the number
of edges, which is ‖d‖1. The overall friend-of-friend average is therefore
d⊤d
‖d‖1
.
So the friendship paradox is equivalent to the inequality
d⊤d
‖d‖1
− ‖d‖1
n
≥ 0. (1)
To see why (1) is always true, we recall from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality [14] that for any
u, v ∈ Rn we have
u⊤v ≤ ‖u‖2‖v‖2. (2)
Taking u = 1, this implies
‖v‖1 ≤
√
n ‖v‖2. (3)
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4 D. J. HIGHAM
For ‖v‖1 = 0, after squaring and rearranging we may write this inequality in the form
v⊤v
‖v‖1
− ‖v‖1
n
≥ 0. (4)
So we see that the friendship paradox inequality (1) is always satisfied.
Further, equality holds in the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality (2) if and only if u is a multiple of v. So
we have equality in the friendship paradox inequality (1) if and only if the network is regular—all nodes
have the same degree.
To define the generalized friendship paradox [5] a non-negative quantity xi ≥ 0 is assigned to node
i, and we compare the average over the nodes,
‖x‖1
n
,
with the average over neighbours of nodes,
x⊤d
‖d‖1
.
The numerator x⊤d in the latter quantity arises because in the overall sum each node i contributes its
value xi a total of di times. The denominator ‖d‖1 arises because each edge is used twice. Hence, we may
say that a generalized friendship paradox with respect to the quantity x arises if
d⊤x
‖d‖1
− ‖x‖1
n
≥ 0. (5)
Note that the original version (1) corresponds to the case where x is the degree vector.
Introducing the covariance between two vectors u, v ∈ Rn as
Cov(u, v) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(ui − µu) (vi − µv),
where
µu =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ui and µv =
1
n
n∑
i=1
vi
denote the corresponding means, we may rewrite (5) as
1
µd
Cov(d, x) ≥ 0.
Hence, as indicated in [5], a generalized friendship paradox with respect to the quantity x arises if x is
non-negatively correlated with degree.
Rather than considering an externally defined attribute, as was done in the tests of [5, 8], we will look
at circumstances where x is a network centrality measure that quantifies the relative importance of each
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CENTRALITY-FRIENDSHIP PARADOXES 5
node. In this way we can address, in the same generality as the original work [1], the question: are our
friends more important than us, on average?
3. Eigenvector centrality paradox
In this section we consider the case of eigenvector centrality [10, 12, 15–17]. To make this centrality
measure well-defined, we assume that the network is connected, and hence the symmetric matrix A is
irreducible. From Perron–Frobenius theory [14], we know that A has a real, positive, dominant eigen-
value λ1 that is equal to ‖A‖2, the matrix two-norm of A. The centrality measure is then given by the
corresponding Perron–Frobenius eigenvector x, which satisfies Ax = λ1x and has positive elements.
We have the following result.
Theorem 3.1 Given any connected network, the generalized friendship paradox inequality (5) holds for
eigenvector centrality, with equality if and only if the network is regular.
Proof. Here, x denotes the Perron–Frobenius eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ1. From the
definition of the subordinate matrix two-norm, we have
λ1 = ‖A‖2 ≥ ‖A
1√
n
‖2 = ‖
d√
n
‖2. (6)
Using (3), this implies
λ1 ≥
1√
n
‖ d√
n
‖1. (7)
Hence,
d⊤x = 1⊤Ax = 1⊤λ1x = λ1‖x‖1 ≥
‖d‖1
n
‖x‖1,
and we see that (5) always holds. Further, because x is the only eigenvector whose elements are all
positive, we have equality in (6) if and only if x is a multiple of 1; that is, if and only if the network is
regular. 
4. Matrix function centrality paradox
We now move on to the case where x is defined from a power series expansion
x = (c0I + c1A+ c2A2 + · · · ) 1. (8)
Here, we assume that ck ≥ 0 for all k and that these coefficients have been chosen in such a way that the
series converges. Centrality measures of this type have been studied by several authors, see, for example,
[10, 12, 17–23]. They can bemotivated from the combinatoric fact that (Ak)ij counts the number of distinct
walks of length k between i and j. Particular examples are
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6 D. J. HIGHAM
• Katz centrality [24], where ck = αk . Here the real parameter α must be chosen such that 0 <
α < 1/ρ(A), where ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius of A. In this case x solves the linear system
(I − αA)x = 1.
• total centrality [18, 19], where ck = βk/k! for some positive real parameter β. In this case the series
converges for any β, and x may be written x = exp(βA)1. Other factorial-based coefficients have
also been proposed [20].
• odd and even centralities based on odd and even power series, such as those for sinh and cosh [23].
We also note that degree centrality, on which the original friendship paradox is based, corresponds to
c1 = 1 in (8) with all other coefficients equal to zero.
Our aim in this section is to look for conditions under which the generalized friendship paradox (5)
holds for centrality measures of the form (8).
For x in (8) we have
‖x‖1 = c0n+ c11⊤A1 + c21⊤A21 + · · · .
and
d⊤x = c01⊤A1 + c11⊤A21 + c21⊤A31 + · · · .
So the generalized friendship paradox inequality (5) may be written
(
c01⊤A1 + c11⊤A21 + c21⊤A31 + · · ·
)− (c0n+ c11⊤A1 + c21⊤A21 + · · · ) 1⊤A1
n
≥ 0. (9)
By comparing terms in the two expansions, we arrive at the following sufficient condition.
Theorem 4.1 The generalized friendship paradox inequality (5) holds for x in (8) if
1⊤Ak+11 ≥ 1⊤Ak1 1
⊤A1
n
, (10)
for every k ≥ 1 for which ck > 0.
Proof. We see that the term on the left-hand side of (9) involving c0 collapses to zero. Generally, we may
obtain a sufficient condition by asking for each individual term involving ck to be greater than or equal
to zero, for all k ≥ 1. This leads to (10). 
We note that the sufficient condition (10) has a simple combinatoric interpretation: the total number
of walks of length k + 1 must dominate the product of the total number of walks of length k and the
average degree.
To proceed we make use of the following result.
Theorem 4.2 (Lagarias et al. [13]) For any positive integers r and s such that r + s is even, we have
1⊤Ar+s1 ≥ 1
⊤Ar1 1⊤As1
n
. (11)
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CENTRALITY-FRIENDSHIP PARADOXES 7
Proof. See [13, Theorem 1]. 
In words, Theorem 4.2 says that, for r + s even, the total number of walks of length r + s dominates
the product of the total number of walks of length r and the total number of walks of length s, scaled by
the number of nodes, n.
This theorem allows us to deal with odd power series:
Theorem 4.3 The generalized friendship paradox inequality (5) holds for x in (8) in the case where
ck = 0 for k even, with equality if and only if the network is regular.
Proof. First, suppose the network is regular. Let deg denote the common degree, so thatA1 = deg1. Since
1 is an eigenvectorwith positive entries, itmust be thePerron–Frobenius eigenvector, so deg = λ1 = ‖A‖2.
Then 1⊤Ak1 = 1⊤λk11 = n λk1 for all k ≥ 0. It follows that for each ck , the term on the left-hand side of
(9) collapses to zero, giving equality.
Now suppose that the network is not regular. On the left-hand side of (9), the coefficient c1 receives
the factor d⊤d−‖d‖21/n. This quantity relates to the original friendship paradox—see (1)—and is strictly
positive by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. To deal with the remaining terms, it is then enough to show
that (10) holds for odd k > 1. This is done by taking r = k and s = 1 in (11). 
The next result focuses on Katz centrality. The α → 0+ limit of Katz corresponds to degree. So it
is intuitively reasonable that ‘by continuity’ the original friendship paradox should transfer to Katz for
sufficiently small α. This theorem formalizes the argument.
Theorem 4.4 Consider the case where ck = αk in (8). For any network there exists a value α⋆ > 0 such
that the generalized friendship paradox inequality (5) holds for all parameter values 0 < α < α⋆, with
equality if and only if the network is regular.
Proof. First, suppose the network is regular.We are using deg to denote the common degree, so d = deg1.
It follows that x = 1/(1−αdeg) is the unique solution to the Katz centrality equation (I −αA)x = 1 for
all 0 < α < 1/deg. Because x is a multiple of the degree vector, we have equality in (5).
Now suppose that the network is not regular, so d is not a multiple of 1. With ck = αk , and α small,
the left-hand side of (9) may be expanded as
α
(
d⊤d − ‖d‖
2
1
n
)
+ O(α2),
and we see that the factor in parentheses is strictly positive. 
5. Directed networks
In this section, we consider the case of unweighted directed networks, so A is no longer assumed to
be symmetric. To be concrete when discussing results, we imagine that the network represents human–
human follower relationships on a social media platform. So an edge from i to j, represented by aij = 1,
indicates that person i follows person j.
We define the out-degree vector and in-degree vector by
dout = A1 and din = A⊤1,
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8 D. J. HIGHAM
respectively. Hence, douti counts the number of people that person i follows, and d inj counts the number of
people who follow person j. Note that
‖dout‖1 = ‖din‖1 =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij.
Our first observation is that the inequality (4) holds for any non-zero vector v, with equality if and
only if v is a multiple of 1. Hence we have
dout⊤dout
‖dout‖1
− ‖d
out‖1
n
≥ 0 and d
in⊤din
‖din‖1
− ‖d
in‖1
n
≥ 0. (12)
A little care is needed when interpreting these inequalities. The total dout⊤dout arises if we take each
person in turn, look at the people who follow them, and record how much following these people do. (In
this way, each person k shows up doutk times as a follower, each time contributing the number of people
they follow, doutk .) Similarly, din⊤din arises if we take each person in turn, look at the people who they
follow, and record how many times these people are followed. (In this way, each person k shows up d ink
times as being followed, each time contributing the number of people who follow them, d ink .)
In words, it is always true that
(i) our followers follow at least as many people as us, on average (and there is equality if and only if
everybody follows the same number of people), and
(ii) the people we follow have at least as many followers as us, on average (and there is equality if and
only if everybody has the same number of followers).
From the discussion in Section 2, we also see that the in-out/out-in analogue of (12) and corresponding
statements are valid only if Cov(dout,din) ≥ 0. Simple examples where Cov(dout,din) is negative include
the outward star graph where the only edges start at node 1 and end at nodes 2, 3, . . . , n, for which
dout =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
n− 1
0
0
.
.
.
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ and d
in =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
1
1
.
.
.
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦,
and also the corresponding inward star graph. A strongly connected example has edges from node 1 to
nodes 2, 3, . . . , n and from node i to node i+1 for i = 2, 3, . . . , n−1, plus an edge from node n to node 2
and an edge from node n back to node 1. Here, we have
dout =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
n− 1
1
1
.
.
.
1
2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and din =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
2
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (13)
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CENTRALITY-FRIENDSHIP PARADOXES 9
In this case, dout⊤din = 3n − 1 and ‖dout‖1 = ‖din‖1 = 2n − 1, so dout⊤din − ‖dout‖1‖din‖1/n =
−n+ 3− 1/n, which is negative for n ≥ 3. Hence, for such graphs it is not true that
(iii) our followers have at least as many followers as us, on average, or
(iv) the people we follow are following at least as many people as us, on average.
Taking a step back and comparing (i) and (ii) with (iii) and (iv), it is intuitively clear that the first two
cases can contribute to a sampling bias, whereas the second two cannot. For example, in (i) by allowing a
person to follow us we increase the number of people they follow, but in (iii) allowing a person to follow
us has no effect on the number of people who follow them.
The reference [8] is unusual in that it tests the friendship paradox on directed networks. The authors
consider the four versions (i)–(iv) and find that the paradox holds in each case for a large social network
constructed from Twitter data. Our reasoning above shows that two of these versions will hold for all
directed networks.
For an arbitrary network measure x the relevant inequality that describes the out-degree version of
the generalized friendship paradox (5) is
dout⊤x
‖dout‖1
− ‖x‖1
n
≥ 0. (14)
Similarly, the in-degree version is
din⊤x
‖din‖1
− ‖x‖1
n
≥ 0. (15)
We now consider eigenvector centrality as our network measure. We assume that the network is
strongly connected so that A is irreducible. In this directed case, we have potentially distinct left and
right Perron–Frobenius eigenvectors, which we denote xL and xR, respectively. Here, AxR = λ1xR and
x⊤LA = λ1x⊤L , with λ1 = ρ(A). Both vectors xL and xR have positive components.
The next result characterizes two cases.
Theorem 5.1 For a strongly connected directed network the out-degree generalized friendship paradox
inequality (14) holds for the case where x = xL if and only if
λ1 ≥
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aij
n
. (16)
Similarly, (16) also characterizes the in-degree generalized friendship paradox (15) where x = xR.
Proof. When x = xL we have
dout⊤x = 1⊤A⊤xL = 1⊤λ1xL = λ1‖xL‖1.
It follows that (14) reduces to (16).
The second statement may be proved by replacing A with A⊤. 
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10 D. J. HIGHAM
It is of interest to note that for our unsymmetricA, a classical result is that λ1 lies between theminimum
out-degree or in-degree and the maximum out-degree or in-degree [14, Theorem 8.1.22]. However, it is
not true in general that λ1 dominates the average in-degree (and hence average out-degree). An example
is given by the strongly connected graph with adjacency matrix
A =
⎡
⎣ 0 1 10 0 1
1 0 0
⎤
⎦
.
In this case λ1 is the real root of λ3 − λ− 1, which has the form
λ1 =
−1
3
(
C + 3
C
)
, for C = 3
√
−27+
√
621
2
,
where 3
√· denotes the real cube root. Here λ1 ≈ 1.3247, which is strictly below the average out/in degree
of 4/3. Hence, for such networks Theorem 5.1 shows that neither the out-degree generalized friendship
paradox for x = xL nor the in-degree generalized friendship paradox for x = xR applies.
Matrix function-based centrality measures of the form (8) continue to make sense for directed net-
works. Here, the entry (Ak)ij counts the number of distinct directed walks of length k from i to j. We will
focus on the Katz case, where
x = (I + αA+ α2A+ · · · ) 1. (17)
Let us first check how this measure correlates with in-degree. The relevant difference din⊤x −
‖din‖1 ‖x‖1/n from (15) then takes the form
1⊤A
(
I + αA+ α2A2 + · · · ) 1 − 1⊤ (I + αA+ α2A2 + · · · ) 11⊤A1
n
.
In terms of powers of α, the zeroth-order term vanishes and the first-order term is
α
(
1⊤A21 − (1
⊤A1)2
n
)
. (18)
In words, we are comparing the total number of directed walks of length two with the square of the total
number of directed walks of length one, scaled by the number of nodes. This difference can be negative—
for example, the graph that was used to give (13) produces 1⊤A21− (1⊤A1)2/n = −n+ 3− 1/n. Hence,
the corresponding generalized friendship paradox fails on this example for small α when n ≥ 3.
We show next that is possible to prove something positive for the alternative out-degree case.
Theorem 5.2 Consider the out-degree generalized friendship paradox inequality (14) in the Katz case
(17). For any network there exists a value α⋆ > 0 such that the inequality holds for all parameter values
0 < α < α⋆, with equality if and only if the network has a common out degree. Further, a sufficient
condition for the inequality to hold for all 0 < α < 1/ρ(A) is that for all k ≥ 1
1⊤A⊤Ak1 ≥ 1⊤Ak1 1
⊤A1
n
. (19)
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Proof. The relevant difference is dout⊤x − ‖dout‖1 ‖x‖1/n, which takes the form
1⊤A⊤
(
I + αA+ α2A2 + · · · ) 1 − 1⊤ (I + αA+ α2A2 + · · · ) 11⊤A1
n
. (20)
The sufficient condition (19) follows by considering powers of α.
Now, suppose the network has a common out degree, so A1 = deg1 for some value deg. Then 1 must
be the Perron–Frobenius right eigenvector, so A1 = λ11, where λ1 is the Perron–Frobenius eigenvalue.
In this case, 1⊤A⊤Ak1 = nλk+11 = 1⊤Ak11⊤A1/n. So we have the stated equality.
Now, suppose the network does not have a common out degree, so A1 is not a multiple of 1. For small
α, the leading term in (20) may be written
α
(
dout⊤dout − ‖d
out‖21
n
)
,
which is positive by Cauchy–Schwarz. Hence a suitable α⋆ exists. 
The Katz centrality measure (17) assigns to node i a weighted sum of all directed walks starting from
node i. In a message-passing context, this measure rewards nodes that are able to broadcast information
effectively. In the limit α → 0 this measure approaches (a shifted version of) the out-degree. As an
alternative, we could replace A by A⊤ in (17). This measure assigns to node i a weighted sum of all
directed walks finishing at node i, thereby rewarding nodes that are able to receive effectively. In the
limit α → 0 this measure approaches (a shifted version of) the in-degree. Analogous versions of the
conclusions that follow (18) and the statement of Theorem 5.2 are then valid with A replaced by A⊤ and
‘in’ and ‘out’ swapped.
We also note that part of Theorem 5.2 extends to the general power series centrality measure x =(
c0I + c1A+ c2A2 + · · ·
)
1—requiring (19) to hold for every k ≥ 1 for which ck > 0 serves as a sufficient
condition.
6. Weighted networks
The results in the previous sections, including [13, Theorem 1], do not require the network to be
unweighted. So the conclusions extend to non-negatively weighted networks if we are willing to use
the formulations (1) and (12) for the friendship paradox and (5), (14) and (15) for the generalized friend-
ship paradox, with the degree vectors having the same definitions: d = A1, dout = A1 din = A⊤1. In this
extended setting, the degree vectors represent sums of weights rather than edge counts, and we note that
the inequalities are invariant to positive rescaling of degree, so we may assume without loss of generality
that d, dout or din have elements that sum to unity. Similarly, we may assume that x also sums to unity.
The friendship and generalized friendship paradoxes then apply if ‘average’ is interpreted as ‘weighted
average’.
7. Discussion
The original friendship paradox has spawned a range of activity in quantitative network science, and it
has been argued that the effect may explain reports of increasing levels of dissatisfaction in online social
interaction [7] and may be systematically distorting our perceptions and behaviours [25]. It has also
been shown that the paradox may be leveraged in order to detect the spread of information or disease,
and to drive effective interventions [1, 6, 26–29]. Our main result, Theorem 3.1, shows that the paradox
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12 D. J. HIGHAM
holds with the same level of generality when we replace number of friends by eigenvector centrality.
Hence, the effect is always present for an attribute that is widely adopted in social network analysis as a
more sophisticated and informative measure of influence than degree centrality. Our work therefore adds
support to the hypotheses in the social science literature relating the paradox to our observed attitudes
and actions. Moreover, it has been found that centrality measures correlate strongly with infectiousness in
studies of the spread of disease [30–32]; in particular, [33] reported that eigenvector centrality was the best
among several options for characterizing superspreaders. So Theorem 3.1 provides further justification
for techniques that exploit the friendship paradox for network monitoring and intervention.
It is of interest to note that the original friendship paradox is based on a purely local quantity—the
number of immediate neighbours. Theorem 3.1 shows that the effect is also present for a global quantity
that takes account of long range interactions. Indeed the walk-based Katz centrality measure, (8) with
ck = αk , interpolates between these two extremes: α → 0 from above reduces to degree and α → 1/ρ(A)
from below becomes eigenvector centrality [17, 19]. Theorem 4.4 shows that Katz maintains the paradox
for sufficiently small α, but it is an open question as to whether there is an undirected network for which
the paradox fails to hold for some 0 < α < 1/ρ(A).
We note that [13] gives a concrete example of a connected network onwhich the total number of walks
of length three is strictly less than the product of the total number of walks of length two and the average
degree; so the inequality (11) is violated for r = 2 and s = 1. It follows that by taking c0 = c2 = 1 and
the remaining ck sufficiently small, we can construct a centrality measure (8) based on a power series with
positive coefficients for which the generalized friendship paradox fails to hold. This raises the question
of categorizing those power series that never give rise to such counterexamples. Theorem 4.3 shows that
odd power series are one such class. We remark that numerical experiments (not described here) on the
r = 2, s = 1 example from [13] indicated that it does not provide a counterexample for a Katz-friendship
paradox—with ck = αk , the α2 term in the left-hand side of (9) makes a negative contribution, but the
sum remains non-negative for all 0 < α < 1/ρ(A).
In [13] it is also stated that for any given network the inequality (11), and hence the sufficiency
condition (10), holds for large enough r + s. This is entirely consistent with the eigenvector result in
Theorem 3.1—increasing α in Katz centrality emphasizes longer walks, and the α → 1/ρ(A)− limit
corresponds to the eigenvector case [17, 19].
To the best of our knowledge, extensions of the friendship paradox to directed networks had only
been studied empirically, as in [8]. In Section 5, we clarified that two of the four out-/in-degree versions
always hold, while the other two may fail. For example, when we allow for a lack of reciprocation it
remains the case that the people we admire have more admirers than us, on average (something many
of us first discovered at high school), and, for the same reason, people we hate are hated by more people
than us, on average. However, it is not true in general that we admire/hate people who admire/hate more
people than us, on average.
We gave in Theorem 5.1 a spectral condition that determines whether the relevant eigenvector cen-
trality maintains the generalized paradox for directed networks. In this unsymmetric setting, it would be
of interest to find useful classes of network for which the spectral condition is satisfied, and also to iden-
tify power series centrality measures for which a generalized friendship paradox is always guaranteed,
thereby extending the sufficiency result in Theorem 5.2.
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